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1. Introduction 
I have two aims with this paper. Firstly, I would like to extract lessons for theory and 
policy from Japan’s experience with banking crises. As such, this paper falls into the 
body of research on banking crises, recent works within which include Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996), Caprio et al. (2005), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), 
Werner (2005), Beck et al. (2006), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Secondly, I aim 
to gain insights into the link between the banking sector and the economy (which are 
again of importance for both theory and policy). This is an important topic that has 
slowly but steadily grown to a substantial body of literature. Many authors recognise 
that banks are ‘special’ in some way (Fama, 1985, Bossone, 1999, James and Smith, 
2000, Ashcraft, 2005), and that the link between the banking sector and the economy 
is of great importance (King and Levine, 1996, Levine, 1997). However, the precise 
details of just what makes banks special, as well as the precise nature of their link to 
the economy have remained unclear or at least disputed. Analysing crises may help 
elucidate these issues. 
 
Japan experienced a number of substantial financial crises during the 20
th century. 
Among them were banking crises that centred on the banking sector but that engulfed 
the entire financial sector and either threatened to or did in fact have an adverse 
impact on the economy. The most gregarious ones are the crises of 1920, of 1927, of 
1945 and the most recent crisis, which began in about 1992 and lasted for over a 
decade, until at least 2003.  
 
There were further, less far-reaching financial crises, of which particularly the first 
(1965) and second (1997) Yamaichi crises deserve mentioning. However, these two 
crises, centred on the threatened or actual insolvency of major securities firm 
Yamaichi Securities and could be said to have been limited in their impact: the first 
remained relatively contained, hardly affecting the banking sector or the economy, 
and the second, while more substantial, merely exacerbated an already ongoing major 
banking and economic crisis.  
 
In what follows I thus focus more narrowly on banking crises, excluding crises that 
are localised and contained primarily in the non-bank financial sector, such as 
securities and insurance company crises, or crises that primarily took the form of a 
stock market crash, without a major independent impact on or from the banking sector. 
Thus I will focus initially on the four banking crises named above, and even within 
those settle on a comparative analysis of the two most diverse, and hence most 
interesting crises. Meanwhile, I will confine a discussion of the two Yamaichi crises 
to a brief comment in the final section of the paper, when the findings are summarised 
(as they offer support for one of the conclusions, namely that the role and type of 
central bank intervention is crucial in times of crises). 
 
It is useful to place the four banking crises within their historical context. The 1920 
crisis was triggered by the economic slowdown after the economic boom of the First 
World War (Japan benefited from the global demand expansion, while hardly being 
involved in hostilities). It coincided with a sharp fall in equity prices (the ‘panic of 
March 1920’, Goldsmith, 1983). In the eyes of some observers the 1927 crisis was a 
continuation of the 1920 crisis, as the banking sector had remained under pressure 
since 1920 and its balance sheet continued to deteriorate gradually; the Great Kanto 
Earthquake of 1923 indeed led to a further rise in bad debts, culminating in the 1927   3
banking crisis.
1  While the economy initially remained resilient, producing strong 
growth even in 1928, the impact was felt in the subsequent years, especially in 1930 
and 1931 (Goldsmith, 1983).  
 
The banking sector was again thrown into a state of crisis in 1945, when the vast 
programme of compulsory war-time credit expansion to the munitions industry on the 
one hand and the government on the other came to an abrupt halt, without the military 
success that provided the ex ante justification. With Japan’s defeat a sober accounting 
of the state of the banking system revealed a virtually total failure of assets and hence 
strictly speaking a state of insolvency.  
 
Finally, the most recent crisis occurred again after a major economic boom – the 
‘bubble economy’ of the 1980s. While this crisis began in slow-motion in about 1992 
and culminated in a final climactic spasm in 2003, in certain respects the negative 
impact on the economy continues to be felt today, as bank lending continues to grow 
at a historically slow pace. Thus it could be argued that this banking and economic 
crisis has become fused with the global financial crisis that began in 2007 and may 
not be over after almost two decades.  
 
As already indicated, I am in this paper also concerned by a second topic, namely the 
link between banking and the economy. It is during times of crisis in the banking 
sector that this link becomes more apparent, and the study of banking crises is thus 
important for extracting insights concerning its features, role and influence. In the 
case of the above Japanese banking crises of the twentieth century, the developments 
in the banking sector indeed appear to have been of significance for the performance 
of the economy.  
 
Especially the two most recent banking crises posed an unprecedented number of 
major challenges to mainstream macroeconomic and monetary economic theory. In 
particular, theory has found it difficult to pinpoint the mechanism that links banking 
crises and economic performance. It is the extent of the recent crisis and the striking 
number of analytical ‘anomalies’ that cannot be explained by standard theories that 
make it so interesting and worthwhile to consider at length. 
 
A study of Japan’s banking crises and the link between banking and the economy that 
emerges from this, including the various policy lessons, could easily fill several 
learned books. Space limitations of a single research paper preclude such detailed 
treatment. However, I would like to turn the space limitations into an advantage by 
proposing to focus presently on a comparative study of two Japanese banking crises 
that have been selected for the purpose of being most effective in yielding lessons and 
policy implications. 
 
Since it is a goal of this study to extract information specifically about the link 
between banking and the economy, it is useful to focus on those banking crises that 
seemed to have a different impact on the economy and contrast the differences. The 
                                                 
1 Some argue that the post-WWI crisis lingered for three years, until the 1923 earthquake led to a 
further exacerbation of the same crisis. For our purposes, however, we define the 1927 crisis as the 
second crisis, as it has distinct features, an identifiable beginning and what can be considered an end. 
Ultimately, however, this issue remains of secondary or tertiary importance for this paper, where the 
focus remains on two particular banking crises, which also happen to be fairly unambiguously defined.   4
study of such episodes is likely to help in identifying crucial aspects of the mechanism 
by which banks affect the economy. It is argued that the greatest contrasts can be seen 
when comparing the protracted banking crisis of the 1990s, which was associated 
with an economic slump lasting more than a decade, and the fundamentally deeper 
and more wide-ranging banking crisis of 1945, which was however not associated 
with any significant downturn in the economy. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: first, we discuss different stylised features of the 
Japanese banking crises, and in particular the ways in which the two selected crises 
and their circumstances differ. The key contrasting features include the depth of the 
banking crisis, the length of the associated economic downturn, the structure of 
corporate finance, and the regulatory environment. On all these counts, the two crises 
differ widely – indeed seem on the opposite end of the spectrum from each other. This 
suggests that the focus on a comparison of these two crises is likely to identify key 
questions that require an answer, and hopefully will yield interesting insights. 
 
We then move to the main section, which is the discussion of the two selected 
banking crises. I begin with the banking crisis of the early 1990s, including how the 
literature concerning the link between banking and the economy has handled it. It is 
seen that the most recent Japanese crisis has posed profound challenges to mainstream 
macroeconomic models. Thus I next introduce the reader to an alternative approach to 
the mainstream approaches, which I found has been able to solve all the ‘puzzles’ and 
‘anomalies’ that traditional approaches could not explain. This approach also 
produces different policy recommendations. 
 
Any analysis of economic history involves hypothesis testing of implicit joint 
hypotheses: we are testing hypotheses about the specific events at the time, jointly 
with our hypotheses about our understanding of how economies function (our 
underlying economic model). I thus make my theoretical model explicit, discussing it 
sandwiched between the first and the second crisis case studies. It is the framework 
that has performed well in explaining – indeed predicting – the banking crisis of the 
1990s and the economic downturn connected to it, which will also be deployed in 
analysing the events of the immediate post-war era. 
 
After this, I present an analysis of the situation of the banking system and its link to 
the economy in the immediate post-war era. It is hoped that in this way the surprising 
outcome of the 1945 crisis can be explained fairly exhaustively. 
 
 
2. Selecting two contrasting banking crises 
 
A comparative study of two identical crises will not yield additional insights. The 
marginal productivity of adding one more crisis case study to any given body of crisis 
studies will be low, if the additional crisis has similar features to previous crises. 
Indeed, economic history is littered with examples of banking crises, many of which 
took surprisingly similar turns. Thus I see it as my first task to identify two Japanese 
crises that seem to maximise the number of diverse features. Ideally, they put 
essential features into such stark relief that they are likely to yield insights with ease. 
   5
There are a number of criteria for classifying banking crises. We focus on severity, 
length of associated economic downturn, the corporate reliance on bank finance, and, 
finally, the regulatory regime concerning the extent of regulation, or the degree to 
which market forces could operate freely. 
 
(a) The severity of banking crises:  
This can be considered to be a linear function of the degree of impairment of the 
banking sector’s balance sheet. In concrete terms, this means the extent of non-
performing assets. Thus an index of severity can be constructed by estimating the 
ratio of non-performing assets (NPA) as percentage of total assets. There are 
numerous legal, accounting, analytical and statistical problems with identifying non-
performing assets, which will remain outside the scope of this study. Here, the view is 
taken that the precise figures are less important than a broad ordinal ranking of ranges. 
We thus propose a severity index from 1 to 5 in discrete numbers, with each integer 
corresponding to about 20% of assets being non-performing. Thus an index reading of 
1 implies an estimate of non-performing assets of up to 20%. An index reading of 2 
implies an estimate of non-performing assets of between 20% to 40%, and so on, until 
an index reading of 5, which implies that between 80% and 100% of bank assets 
should be considered non-performing. 
 
 
Table 1:  Index of severity of banking crises: 
 
Severity Index   % non-performing assets  Verbal description 
1  Up to 20%  Mild 
2  21 – 40%  Moderately severe 
3  41 – 60%  Severe 
4  61 – 80%  Highly severe 
5  81 – 100%  Most severe 
 
 
(b) The length of the subsequent economic downturn: 
This can simply be measured in years. While this should not directly be considered a 
measure of the extent of the crisis itself, it is a stylised indicator of the impact the 
crisis may have had on the economy (although of course at this early stage no direct 
causation can be implied by prior timing; such causal analysis depends on a more 
detailed model of the link between banks and the economy, as discussed later in this 
paper). 
 
There are two further features, which concern the importance of the banking sector in 
the economy, and the regulatory environment: 
 
(c) Corporate reliance on bank finance: 
The dependence on bank finance can be measured by the percentage of external 
corporate finance derived from banks, as opposed to funding from capital markets. 
Ministry of Finance data, largely survey-based, can be used for this purpose. 
 
Information about corporate finance serves to indicate the importance of the banking 
sector: A banking crisis that happens at a time when bank finance is the major – or 
even only – source of external finance should be expected to have a different impact   6
on the economy from banking crises that happen in an environment where external 
finance from banks is less important and access to capital markets are readily 
available.  
 
(d) Degree of regulation: 
This criterion measures the regulatory environment. Banking crises and their impact 
on the economy potentially play out differently in an environment where government 
regulation and intervention is pervasive, as compared to an environment where 
markets are allowed to adjust freely and market forces can contribute more towards 
restructuring and revival of the economy. In principle, a regulatory indicator is also a 
linear function of the extent of regulatory direction and government intervention. 
Unlike with non-performing assets or the percentage of bank finance, there is not one 
obvious measure of the degree of government intervention. While one may be 
constructed, for our – basic – purposes we rely on an institutional analysis to crudely 
classify the regulatory environment into five classes of unregulated, deregulated, 
regulated, controlled (pervasive regulation, while maintaining a private sector and 
other features of market economies, i.e. not a planned economy) and planned 
(direction of most economic activity, as in Soviet-style economies). This classification, 
described in Table 2, has the advantage that it does not require further detailed 
statistical evaluation of the degrees of regulation. These may be of interest in future 
research, but would be fraught with a variety of problems.  
 
Meanwhile, our classification enables us to readily indentify economies with little 
room for disagreement or interpretation (except perhaps between index reading 2 and 
3). By way of example, the Soviet Union would have had a regulation index of 5. 
Most of today’s mixed economies, such as the UK, Germany or the US, would have a 
regulation index reading of 2 or 3. Hong Kong in its colonial heyday would obtain a 
reading of 1. Nazi Germany and wartime Japan would obtain a reading of 4.  
 
 
Table 2:  Index of the degree of regulation of the economy 
 
     
Regulation 
Index 
Classification Verbal  description 
 
1 Unregulated  free  markets,  law & order intervention only 
2  Deregulated  more than law & order intervention, but 
deregulated (post-deregulation) 
3  Regulated  more than law & order intervention, not 
deregulated 
4  Controlled  pervasive regulation and intervention, while 
maintaining market incentives 
5 Planned  proscription  of  economic activity; little use 
of private property and market mechanism 
 
 
We can now utilise these four criteria to attempt to classify and compare the 4 main 
Japanese banking crises of the 20
th century. The result is shown in Table 3. 
 
   7
Table 3: Banking crises in 20
th century Japan 
 
Banking 
crisis 
Severity of 
banking crisis 
Severity of 
downturn 
Dependence on 
bank finance 
Regulatory 
environment 
1920  2 (mod. severe)  1 year  < 50%  3 (regulated) 
1927  3 (severe)  3 years  < 50%  2 (deregulated) 
1945  5 (most severe)  1 year  100%  4 (controlled)  
1992-2003  2 (mod. severe)  11+ years  < 50%  2 (deregulated) 
 
 
While some classifications remain stylised estimates at this stage, one conclusion is 
likely to stand up well to further research: the crises with the most diverse features are 
the 1945 crisis and the most recent crisis. The former was most severe, with virtually 
100% of the aggregate bank balance sheet impaired, while the latter was only of 
modest severity: The post-1991 crisis, while featuring a severe deterioration in bank 
balance sheets, was less severe than many banking crises in Japan during the 20
th 
century: The aggregate total amount of incipient bad debts was estimated at Y80-100 
trn by Werner (1995b), approximately up to 20% of outstanding loans (an estimate 
that proved to be correct with the hindsight of another decade, having been 
controversial during much of its life).   
 
At the same time, the 1945 crisis was associated with the shortest economic downturn, 
while the 1990s’ crisis was followed by the longest. This is a surprising contrast: 
ceteris paribus, a more severe banking crisis can be expected to be associated with a 
longer economic downturn. However, on a mutatis mutandis basis this does not have 
to be the case: a key variable factor that we will consider in the main section is the 
government response to crises. 
 
These two crises also differ most, when considering the importance of the banking 
sector for corporate finance. In the 1920s and until the early 1940s, Japanese 
companies raised external funds to a large extent from the capital markets. Thus the 
banking crises of 1919-21 and 1927 occurred at a time when banks were not yet the 
core source of funding for firms (see Figure 1 below). During the 1940s, due to 
restrictive wartime legislation, direct finance in capital markets had been virtually 
abolished (Goldsmith, 1983; Tsutsui, 1988).
2  As many relevant laws and ordinances 
were re-instated after 1945 as part of emergency measures, this situation persisted in 
the first few years after the end of the war. Hence at the time of the 1945 banking 
crisis, bank funding accounted for virtually 100% of all external fund-raising. One 
would expect the reverberations of the problems in the banking sector to have a severe 
impact on corporate fund raising and aggregate demand and hence the impact of the 
banking crisis to be large and persistent in the economy. This fact makes the above 
two features of the 1945 crisis the more intriguing: the banking system was most 
impaired in 1945, and virtually the only source for external finance by firms. Yet, the 
impact on the economy of this most severe impairment of the banking sector was the 
smallest of all the banking crises in the 20
th century.  
 
                                                 
2  “By the last years of the war, with retained earnings dwindling and the ‘direct’ finance option 
effectively closed, industrial enterprises were forced into an unprecedented, virtually complete 
dependence on the banking system for all commercial and investment funding” (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 14).   8
Meanwhile, the crisis of 1992-2003 happened when banks were only modestly 
impaired, bank funding had become – especially by the second half of the 1990s – far 
less important than at any time since the 1930s and there was free access to alternative 
funding mechanisms – ranging from healthy foreign financial institutions that had 
increasingly become active in Japan to non-bank financial institutions and deregulated 
and effective capital markets. Consequently, as various observers have commented 
(e.g. Meltzer, 1999), a priori one might have expected that the recent crisis should 
have had a far less severe impact on the economy – yet it turned out to be the most 
prolonged and damaging crisis for the economy of all 20
th century crises.
 3  
 
 
Figure 1: Bank finance versus capital market finance in the 20
th century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, there is the another aspect of this comparison that is of interest: the economic 
system of the immediate post-war years (until the end of the 1960s) was characterised 
by the persistence of war-time economic controls in the form of a ‘controlled 
economy’ or, more precisely, a ‘guided market economy’, whereby bureaucratic 
administrative guidance and controls were used to intervene in an otherwise market 
and private property-based economic structure. The system of centralised government 
guidance established in 1942 and the following years relied on the control and 
allocation of bank credit as its central feature (Takahashi, 1967; Tsutsui, 1988; 
Werner, 2003). By the mid-1990s, Japan’s economy had become largely deregulated 
and market oriented, with few, if any forms of direct government controls and explicit 
‘guidance’. 
 
This structural reform can be illustrated by the number of official cartels (official 
exemptions from the anti-monopoly laws). Figure 2 shows this number over time. It 
peaked at over 1,000 in the 1960s, then declined and reached zero in the late 1990s. 
As the anti-monopoly law did not exist in 1945, the data series starts later, but for the 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that some observers did not correctly predict the severity of the pending Japanese 
crisis. Werner (1991) predicted that, without suitable central bank policy reaction, Japanese banks were 
on track to experience severe distress akin to bankruptcy and the economy was headed for the worst 
recession since the Great Depression. 
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immediate post-war years, the number of cartels can be considered to be at least as 
high as in the 1950s. 
 
Figure 2: The number of official cartels in Japan during the post-war era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, an a priori expectation might be that the more controlled economy of 1945 
should perform less well, including in times of stress, while the market mechanism 
should have held the economy in good stead during the difficult periods that began in 
the 1990s. However, the controlled and ‘guided’ economy of the early post-war years 
proved remarkably robust when faced with the most severe types of shocks, while the 
market economy appeared much more fragile, and as we will see there is some 
indication that the very lack of direct government intervention may have been a 
reason for the prolonged slump of the 1990s. (It has been noted elsewhere that Japan 
seems to provide little evidence for the hypothesis that a move towards markets and 
away from regulations and cartels is positive for economic performance; Werner, 
2004a).  
 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the marginal benefit of a comparative study is 
maximised by examining the two crises that maximise diversity in features, and 
indeed seem to offer a case study in stark and surprising contrasts: the 1992-2003 
banking crisis and the 1945 banking crisis.  
 
Before moving on to the analysis of these two crises, a comment is justified on the 
1927 banking crisis, which tends to be emphasised in economic histories of Japan 
(while the 1945 crisis tends to get neglected), if only to be sure that there are few new 
insights likely to be gleaned from it. There can be no doubt that it was a severe 
banking crisis. However, little about it is surprising: the prevailing banking legislation 
was the 1890 Bank Act and its 1895 revision. These set no minimum capitalisation for 
financial institutions. They put no restrictions on the outside business activities of 
banks. They established no statutory limits on advances to a single customer. “Loan 
practices were often patently unsound as banks engaged in speculative advances, 
made extensive loans to directors and frequently concentrated their lending on one 
customer” (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 3). Furthermore, the government or central bank imposed 
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no reserve requirements. The establishment of banks was not subject to a license. 
Branching and mergers did not require official authorisation. There was no obligation 
to submit financial reports to a bank supervisor and no banking regulator engaged in 
bank examinations.
4 
 
After the economic boom of the second half of World War I, Japan’s economy 
slumped. This put pressure on the fragile banking system. The Great Kanto 
earthquake created further losses, bankruptcies and non-performing loans. Thus by 
1927, the situation of the banking sector had become so shaky that bank runs were not 
uncommon. Given the virtually complete lack of bank regulation and prudential 
supervision, none of this could be a surprise. To the contrary, today it may be more 
surprising that the Japanese banking sector weathered almost 4 decades without a 
major banking crisis as happened in 1927. Given that the 1927 crisis was 
characterised by weak banking practice and regulation (or lack thereof) far removed 
from today’s practice, it seems clear that there would be little mileage in including the 
1927 banking crisis in our comparative study. 
 
 
3. The Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s and the challenge to economic theory 
 
Details of the 1990s banking crisis are discussed elsewhere (see Werner, 1992, 1997b, 
1999b, 2003b, 2004b, 2005). In brief: Banks had extended credit irresponsibly in the 
1980s and from about 1992 onwards began to realise that their loan portfolios were 
likely to be worth less than they had anticipated. Non-performing loans (NPL) began 
to rise, although for almost a decade official NPL figures remained an underestimate 
of the true extent of the problem. Banks reacted predictably: they became more risk-
averse and reduced their extension of new credit. Bank credit growth declined 
significantly from about 1991 onwards. From about 1997 onwards, the growth rate 
became negative. Bank credit only staged a modest recovery in late 2005 (see Figure 
3). 
 
 
Figure 3:  Growth of bank credit extended by Japanese banks 
 
                                                 
4 Many – though by no means all – of these weaknesses were addressed in the 1928 reforms. The 1928 
reforms gave extensive supervisory powers to the Ministry of Finance, required the submission of 
financial reports and gave the government authority to inspect banks. But even after the 1928 reforms, 
banks did not have to set any legal standards for the concentration of loans to a single client, minimum 
cash reserves, maximum terms for commercial bank advances or the determination of suitable 
collateral (Tsutsui, 1988).   11
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While the state of the banking sector continued to deteriorate steadily during the 
1990s, the central bank and the government were reluctant to take any decisive 
measure to address the problem. However, the banking sector on its own found it 
impossible to escape from the vicious cycle that had evolved: non-performing loans 
made banks reluctant to extend credit. Lack of credit was cited by a large number of 
companies, especially small and medium-sized firms, as the reason for their own 
problems. As these credit-rationed firms cut back operations, including employment, 
demand weakened. This increased bankruptcies (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4:    
 
 
 
The increased number of bankruptcies raised the amount of non-performing loans. 
That rendered banks even more risk-averse. The downward spiral continued (Figure 
5). Annual bankruptcy numbers rose from less than 10,000 in 1991 to over 30,000 per 
annum by the end of the decade. There were many other features of utmost financial 
distress, including the worrying rise of suicides to record highs. According to the 
Metropolitan Police Agency, the majority of their increase during the 1990s was due 
to recession-related – and, specifically, debt-related – problems. 
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Figure 5:  The vicious cycle 
 
 
credit creation falls 
        
                corporate distress, bankruptcies 
      
non-performing  loans  increase,         
rendering banks more risk averse                        labour market  
                                deterioration 
 
    bad debt rises       demand contracts, 
growth falls, 
deflation 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, overall economic growth fell sharply, and inflation receded, yielding to 
deflation (Figures 6 and 7). 
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Figure 6:   
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Figure 7:   
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As some voices had warned in good time (Werner, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996), the 
banking sector was unable to extricate itself from the vicious downward spiral without 
suitable help from the central bank and the government. Central bank and government 
were not entirely inactive. They adopted orthodox policy prescriptions: The central 
bank began a series of interest rate reductions, starting with a reduction when short-
term interest rates were 7% in 1991, and ending with short-term interest rates at 0.001 
more than ten years later. The government implemented a series of fiscal expenditure 
packages, beginning in 1992. In aggregate, these amounted to what then was the 
largest peace-time fiscal expenditure programme in the post-war era. As had been 
predicted early on, neither of these policies would have the desired result (Werner, 
1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996). From about 1995 onwards, the government therefore 
took the view that demand management policies having failed, supply-side reforms 
were required: it adopted a far-reaching structural reform programme, which was 
implemented from 1996 onwards. However, as critics had warned (Werner, 1996), 
structural reforms to raise the potential growth rate were likely to exacerbate the 
deflation problem: if successful, the output gap between potential and actual growth   14
would be widened. Indeed, from 1997 onwards, Japan witnessed deflation – and holds 
the world record for the longest number of consecutive years of deflation. By late 
2009, Japan was back in deflation. 
 
Meanwhile, the Japanese macroeconomic experience posed a profound challenge to 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. In brief, all of the mainstream theories – neo-classical 
(including supply-side), Keynesian, post-Keynesian and monetarist – had been refuted 
by the Japanese empirical record (see Werner, 2003b, 2005, 2007 for a detailed 
discussion). 
 
These puzzles remain unexplained by orthodox theory. The monetarist prescription to 
increase high-powered money (or their subset, bank reserves) had been predicted to 
fail (Werner, 1995a,b,c) and did fail to deliver, when the Bank of Japan adopted it in 
2001 (under the mis-appropriated label ‘quantitative easing’; this concept had earlier 
been proposed and correctly defined by Werner, 1995c). The Keynesian and post-
Keynesian prescription of fiscal expansion had been predicted to fail (Werner, 
1995a,b,c) and did fail to stimulate the economy – each package underperforming the 
ever more modest expectations of government and private-sector economists – and 
merely left it saddled with record debt. The so-called ‘credit view’ approach 
(consisting of the credit rationing argument a la Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; the bank 
lending channel, a la Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, and the balance sheet channel – see 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) failed, as interest rate policy failed to have an additional 
positive impact via the bank lending channel, and as it remained inexplicable why 
impaired banks should be a problem in an economy with a thriving non-bank sector, 
healthy and hungry foreign banks and foreign lenders, and capital markets that were 
more deregulated than ever before. As noted above, the supply-side prescription to 
deregulate, liberalise and privatise in order to stimulate the economy also failed (as 
predicted by Werner, 1995a,b,c; 1996a,b; see also Werner, 2004a). Finally, the almost 
universal prescription to lower interest rates had been predicted to fail (Werner, 
1995a,b,c) and did fail to stimulate the economy despite a record number of 
consecutive interest rate reductions and record-low interest rates.  
  
The last point deserves further elaboration. It is often argued that the ‘liquidity trap’ 
argument, as advanced by Krugman (1998) and Ito (2000) had solved the puzzle of 
ineffective interest rate policy. The facts could not be further from the truth. The 
liquidity trap argument, as propounded in the aftermath of the Japanese crisis, defines 
a liquidity trap as the situation whereby interest rates have fallen to the lowest level 
they can fall – so that no further falls are possible. It is then argued that monetary 
policy stimulation becomes ineffective, since it is defined as interest rate reductions, 
and fiscal stimulation will be effective to escape from the liquidity trap.  
 
There are a number of problems with this argument. Firstly, fiscal stimulation was 
singularly ineffective in triggering a recovery in the Japanese economy. Secondly, the 
liquidity trap argument fails to explain why a liquidity trap occurs in the first place. 
Thirdly, the liquidity trap argument, by its own definition, only applies to the Japan of 
March 2003, when both long and short term interest rates hit the lowest levels on 
record. It thus says nothing at all about the period in question, namely from 1992 to 
2003. Fourthly, the interesting puzzle is why interest rate reductions have failed to 
have the desired effect. The liquidity trap argument is silent on this issue, as it is not 
concerned with it: it only discusses the moment in time when short-term interest rates   15
have reached their lowest point (2003) and asserts that at this point interest rate 
reductions will not work; which is true by definition, hence rendering the argument a 
tautology without insights. It remains altogether silent on why more than a decade of 
interest rate reducations have been ineffective. 
 
  
4. A model linking banks and the economy 
 
While the orthodox approaches had failed spectacularly when confronted with the 
challenge of the Japanese macroeconomic performance, an alternative framework had 
been proposed as early as 1991 and 1992 (Werner, see also 1997, 1998, various 
publications), which renders explicit the link between the banking sector and the 
economy, explains and predicts banking crises and identifies successful policy 
responses and policies to prevent banking crises. 
 
This model can also account for a number of additional ‘anomalies’ or ‘puzzles’ that 
the mainstream approaches have had difficulties with, such as the puzzle of the 
‘velocity’ decline and ‘breakdown in the money demand function’, the issue of 
recurring banking crises, of recurring asset price bubbles and collapses, of Japanese 
net long-term capital outflows (rising to record levels in the 1980s and collapsing in 
the early 1990s), and, on a fundamental level, the issue of what makes banks special, 
and how they are linked to economic performance. It is the latter we will start with. 
 
Fama (1985), as well as others (e.g. Ashcraft, 2005), have found that empirically there 
appears to be something special about banks. However, standard theories, including in 
banking and finance, consider banks to be merely one particular type of financial 
intermediary. Werner (1991, 1992, 1997b, 2001, 2003b, 2005, 2007) has emphasised 
that what makes banks special both theoretically and empirically is the ability of each 
individual bank to create money out of nothing – a process called ‘credit creation’. 
This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8:  An accurate representation of credit creation 
 
          Balance Sheet of Bank A 
 
Step 1  Deposit of $100 by customer at Bank A 
 
Assets Liabilities 
 $100 
 
 
Step 2  $100 used to increase the reserve of Bank A 
 
Assets Liabilities 
$100 $100 
 
 
Step 3  Loan of $9,900 granted, by crediting borrower’s bank account with deposit 
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Assets Liabilities 
$100  
+ 
 
$9,900  
$100 
+ 
 
$9,900 
 
Source: Werner (2005). 
 
 
While earlier writers, such as Macleod (1855), Wicksell (1898), Schumpeter (1912) 
and others recognised the ability of each individual bank to create credit, authors in 
the post-war era (see Tobin, 1963) merely referred to the ability of the banking system 
in total to create credit by a mechanical process of successive financial intermediation 
that seemed to render each bank a mere financial intermediary (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9  The Textbook Representation of Money Multiplication (RR=1%) 
 
    deposit    –   1% reserve     =     loanable funds 
 
Bank A
  
$100  –  $1  =  $99.00  
         + 
 
Bank B
  
$99  –  $0.99  =  $98.01  
         + 
 
Bank C
  
$98.01  –  $0.9801  =  $97.0299 
         + 
 
….. 
….. 
  maximum amount eventually                                =========== 
lent by the banking system:              Σ $9,900.00 
 
 
Source: Werner (2005) 
 
 
Since each bank in this view is but a financial intermediary, and a mechanical link is 
assumed to exist between a measure of cash and bank reserves (high powered money) 
and broader monetary aggregates (consisting largely of bank deposits), it may appear 
reasonable to neglect the concept of bank credit creation altogether. In the textbooks 
that are today considered most ‘advanced’ in monetary economics, such as Walsh 
(2003) and Woodford (2003), neither credit creation nor the credit or deposit 
multiplier deserve a mentioning. 
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However, Werner (as cited above) has argued that disaggregated credit creation is the 
answer to a range of ‘puzzles’ and ‘anomalies’, including the phenomenon observed 
from the 1980s onwards, when all macroeconomic theories could not deal adequately 
with the fact that there did not seem to be a reliable relationship between monetary 
aggregates (whether narrow or broad) and nominal GDP. This ‘breakdown of the 
money demand function’, ‘velocity decline’ or ‘mystery of the missing money’ was 
the reason why not only monetarist analysis, but also monetary-based 
macroeconomics entered a period of almost terminal decline. 
 
This ‘puzzle’ has been solved. The quantity equation had originally referred to the 
value of transactions on the one side, and a measure of the money used to pay for 
these transactions on the other. It was the Cambridge simplification that relied on 
nominal GDP as a substitute for the value of all transactions – which is only accurate 
when, in growth terms, non-GDP transactions do not grow faster than nominal GDP. 
All asset and financial transactions are non-GDP transactions. Thus in periods of 
increased financial and real estate transactions, the traditional quantity equation must 
record a decline in velocity, as a rising part of the money supply is used for non-GDP 
transactions (Werner, 1992, 1997). 
 
Meanwhile, much literature has lamented the fact that traditional measures of the 
money supply give us no indication of where to draw the line between different types 
of private sector assets (see also Friedman, 1956). Thus textbooks admit that it is hard 
to identify how to measure the money supply (e.g. Miller and VanHoose, 1993). The 
Federal Reserve conceded in one of its publications that ‘there is still no answer to the 
question… “what is money?”’.  
 
Originally, the quantity equation was developed by classical economists for a pure 
gold standard economy. In this case, M was the stock of gold. When economists 
attempted to introduce banking systems, they recognised that the deposit of gold with 
goldsmiths and the issuance of deposit receipts was an important financial innovation. 
They believed its implications could be accurately reflected by counting the deposit 
receipts (i.e. measuring bank deposits). This is the origin of the definition of the 
‘money supply’ as deposits. However, a study of the institutional features of early 
(and later) banking reveals that banking was born, when banks extended new credit by 
issuing deposit receipts – without any deposit having taken place. This is the process 
of credit creation as described above. Thus the accurate representation of banks’ 
activities, and the measure of the ‘money supply’ in a largely non-cash based 
economy, is the quantity of credit creation.   
 
In addition, deposit aggregates were never suitable as measures of M in the quantity 
equation, since it measures money used for transactions. Deposits, however, are 
money out of circulation and not used for transactions. Substituting credit C into the 
quantity equation instead of M not only measures money used for transactions, but 
also solves the problem of the definition of the money supply: credit creation can be 
uniquely defined and measured. Finally, the idea to split credit into transactions used 
for GDP and non-GDP (financial) transactions, as uttered by Fisher, Keynes and 
Friedman (but ultimately dismissed due to the impossibility of thus dividing deposit 
aggregates, as Friedman, 1956, admitted), can be implemented when considering 
credit creation, since credit can be identified by its use. 
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The key equations of the disaggregated credit theorem are: 
 
(1)   CV  =  CRVR  +  CFVF 
 
(2)   CRVR  = PRY 
 
(3)   CFVF  = PFQF 
 
(4)  ∆(PRY) = VR ∆CR  
 
(5)  ∆(PFQF) = VF ∆CF   
 
 
Equation (1) disaggregates the value of credit transactions (credit stock C times 
velocity V) into those credit transactions that are part of GDP (‘real circulation credit’ 
CR) and those credit transactions not part of GDP (‘financial circulation credit’ CF). 
Equations (2) and (3) substitute credit C, though disaggregated, into the standard 
quantity equation, thus obtaining two equations, depending on the use of credit. When 
these are expressed in growth terms, they become equations (4) and (5). Equation (4) 
says that nominal GDP growth ∆(PRY) is proportional to credit creation used for GDP 
transactions. Equation (5) identifies the cause of aggregate asset price movements: 
credit creation used for non-GDP (i.e. asset) transactions. 
 
With the disaggregated credit model, the anomalies and puzzles in macroeconomics, 
including those pertaining to the Japanese economy, can be solved. Specifically, 
velocity, correctly defined, is found to be stable. Nominal GDP growth and credit in 
‘real circulation’ are in a stable relationship. Real estate prices and capital flows can 
be explained. The ineffectiveness of fiscal policy – which is not backed by credit 
creation – is explained (see Werner, 2005, 2007, for evidence and a discussion). The 
model also was able to predict the pending Japanese banking crisis in 1991, the 
temporary recovery of 1996, and correctly predicted that interest, fiscal, structural and 
reserve expansion policy would be unsuccessful, as the necessary and sufficient 
condition for an economic recovery is the expansion in credit creation used for GDP 
transactions, which is not addressed by these policies.  
 
The model distinguishes between productive credit creation, which is credit creation 
used for the creation of new goods and services, and which is non-inflationary, and 
unproductive credit creation, which leads to one of two types of inflation. 
Unproductive credit creation can take the form of ‘consumptive credit’, which is the 
extension of credit for the consumption (but not creation) of goods and services – 
consumer price inflation must follow. Unproductive credit creation can also take the 
form of non-GDP credit, which is credit created for the use in asset or financial 
transactions. This results in asset price inflation. 
 
Unproductive credit creation is unsustainable in the medium to long run. Especially 
credit for financial transactions, if rising persistently so that the ratio CF/C rises, will 
lead to banking crises: only productive credit creation can be serviced and repaid 
reliably; there is no sustainable income stream – apart from the fleeting capital gains 
and expectations of capital gains during times of boom, which are unsustainable – to 
service and repay financial credit.   19
 
Banking crises can thus be avoided by monitoring and restricting – through direct 
intervention in the credit market by way of regulation – the quantity of credit 
extended for non-GDP transactions. The ratio CF/C is a key variable to monitor. In the 
Japanese case it almost doubled in the decade of the 1980s, when the great Japanese 
asset bubble was created (see Figure 10; it is here defined as bank credit to the real 
estate, construction and non-bank financial industries as a proportion of total credit). 
 
 
Figure 10:  The rising financial credit ratio CF/C – precursor to banking crises 
 
 
 
 
 
Fundamentally, the problem behind most banking crises is the fact that the creation of 
the money supply has been privatised and is delegated to the commercial banking 
sector. At the same time, these profit-oriented firms are not asked to consider the 
macroeconomic or social welfare aspects of their activity. Thus often they find it 
expedient to increase the financial credit ratio CF/C, as this seems to maximise short-
term profits from their (short-term) perspective. 
 
Concerning policy prescriptions to end banking crises and produce a sustainable 
recovery, the framework recommends an expansion in productive credit creation, 
while banning credit creation for non-GDP transactions. This can be achieved without 
additional costs to the tax payer in a number of ways, as elaborated by Werner since 
the early 1990s (see Werner, 2007, for references and a summary), such as: 
 
1. Expanding central bank credit to firms for investment (not financial speculation) 
2. Expanding central bank credit to the government (to fund the public sector 
borrowing requirement) 
3. Expanding commercial bank credit by 
(a) halting government bond issuance and instead raising the public sector  
borrowing requirement entirely from the banking sector (Werner, 1996, 1998). 
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
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30%
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93
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(b) providing government guarantees for bank loans to firms. 
(c) engaging in ‘credit guidance’ direct controls of bank credit (or public-
private ‘coordination’ of bank credit), using the well established and 
successful methods of this tool (see Werner, 1998, 2007). This is the method 
China used to be the first major economy to emerge from the current financial 
crisis (Japanese-style ‘window guidance’) (see Chen and Werner, 2009). 
(d) relieving pressure on banks to tighten credit by suspending or loosening 
capital adequacy regulations, and having the central bank purchase NPLs at 
face value (in order to keep them on its balance sheet – any transfer to the 
government will result in crowding out and a negative impact on the economy). 
4. Expanding credit creation through the issuance of government money (e.g. United 
States Notes; in Japan: dasatsu). 
 
Only when the Bank of Japan, under Governor Fukui, re-deployed informal 
‘guidance’ of bank credit did it stage a recovery from late 2005. Previous recoveries 
in bank credit, such as in 1996, were aborted prematurely for policy reasons (see 
Werner, 2001, 2003). 
 
 
4. The Japanese banking crisis of 1945 
 
The problem 
When the war ended in 1945, Japanese bank balance sheets were almost entirely 
impaired: During the last, desperate years of the war, the banks had been ordered to 
extend ever-increasing amounts of credit to the munitions industries, on the one hand, 
and to the government on the other; the latter largely in the form of war bonds or 
other government IOUs. In 1945, two thirds of loans outstanding were to munitions 
firms, many of which suddenly found themselves located outside Japan (in territories 
that had previously been part of Japan) or insolvent. In 1945, with Japan defeated, the 
value of Japan’s war bonds was thought to be close to zero, and the bloated forced 
loans to the war industries were largely non-performing. If traded, these assets would 
fetch only a fraction of their face value. While most bank assets were thus of little 
value, bank liabilities still existed. Assets being smaller than liabilities, and equity 
being insufficient to make up for the difference, the banking system was technically 
bankrupt. 
 
The problems are illustrated by a concerned cable from the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 
1945: ”these concerns may be insolvent and loans uncollectible. Banks also own 
investment in companies located in non-Japanese area which will have to be written 
off. If these losses taken probable that banks capital and surplus quickly wiped out”. 
 
Tsutsui (1988) found that in 1945 the banks “were all virtually insolvent, holding only 
worthless government bonds and debts from companies in no position to repay. A 
nationwide financial crisis, with mass bankruptcies, runs on the banks and the 
resulting social upheaval, seemed a real threat in the first months, and even years, 
after the surrender” (p. 23). 
 
In addition, the commercial banks were weakened by the initial moves toward 
zaibatsu dissolution: The U.S. authorities removed the securities of major zaibatsu   21
group companies from the banks’ vaults for sales to the public. These were both 
valuable assets and collateral for the banks (Tsutsui, 1988, Davis and Roberts, 1996). 
 
While the cause of this banking crisis lay with the wartime government policy, it 
remains within the framework outlined above, namely the excessive creation of credit 
for unproductive purposes (munitions manufacture being one of the least productive 
uses). However, the study of this banking crisis shows that an impaired balance sheet 
– even under such extreme circumstances – does not need to incapacitate a banking 
system or an economy. 
 
There can be little doubt that the asset problems of the banks were sufficiently large to 
create a major credit crunch and deflationary downturn of the economy. To counteract 
that possibility, credit needed to be created. In the early post-war years there were 
many experts who understood this (the leading bureaucrats at the Cabinet Planning 
Board, Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of 
Commerce/Munitions Ministry – MITI’s predecessor – had not been educated at US 
universities in neoclassical economics, but instead had studied economics in 
Germany) and – quite unlike the 1990s – acted speedily to achieve a recovery. 
 
The wartime planning and credit allocation programme operated by the government 
was re-instated soon after 1945. The Cabinet Planning Board was revived in the form 
of the powerful but short-lived (1946–52) Economic Stabilization Board (ESB or 
Keizai Antei Honbu), established in August 1946 (Calder, 1993). 
 
Initial attempts at solving this crisis were however thwarted by the US occupation. 
Later policy initiatives were not fully supported by the Bank of Japan. Thus policy-
makers struggled with political obstacles. 
 
Government policies 
We first consider the issue of impaired bank balance sheets. In the most recent 
Japanese banking crisis, borrowers unable to service their loans were eventually 
foreclosed on by the banks. This raised bankruptcies, unemployment, non-performing 
loans of the banks and thus was a costly process. By contrast, the post-1945 planners 
in Japan decided to avoid this sequence of events by injecting government money to 
help borrowers repay their loans, in the form of granting government indemnities to 
those companies that had losses on government orders that were cancelled due to the 
end of the war. The total amount of all indemnity claims stood at Y70bn, a sum in 
excess of the total war damage to national wealth and three times the central 
government revenues of 1945 (Nanto, 1976).  
 
In other words, the Japanese government planned to inject tax money and give it to 
the borrowers – thus keeping them alive – and enabling them to service and repay 
their bank loans – thus helping improve the NPL figures and hence balance sheets of 
the banking system. This way, the same amount of public money injection would 
support the entire financial ‘food-chain’ from consumer to company employee to 
company balance sheet to bank lender balance sheet. The modern equivalent of this 
policy would be for the Federal Reserve to provide several trillion dollars worth of 
money not to banks, but solely to the sub-prime borrowers, to enable them to repay 
their loans and stay in their homes (with the justification that the Fed had created the 
incentive structure for both borrowers and lenders to embark on a credit spree). By   22
contrast, in the 1990s’ Japan government money was – eventually – injected into the 
banking sector, but the borrowers were foreclosed on. The same applies to most bank 
bail-out packages in response to the so-called global financial crisis of 2008. 
Unfortunately, the innovative Japanese policy initiative of 1945 was vetoed by the US 
occupation, which insisted on taxing away any such payments to the private sector 
again.  
 
Due to the US veto, this experiment could thus not be carried through. All but Y18bn 
worth of indemnities were cancelled in 1946, creating the threat of “a total financial 
collapse” (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 29) due to the negative impact on financial institutions. 
“The effective cancellation of the war indemnity payments forced much of industry 
into insolvency, which in turn rendered virtually all financial institutions bankrupt.” 
(Tsutsui, 1988, p. 29).  
 
As a result, the Japanese government bureaucrats moved to ‘plan B’. This centred on 
an expansion of credit creation via government-owned banks, monetised fiscal policy 
(funded by direct borrowing from banks and the central bank), and measures to 
dispose of non-performing assets.  
 
Concerning the latter item, the goal was to establish ‘growth consistent’ banking 
reform and ensure that economic recovery is not hampered (see Werner, 2002c). For 
this purpose, another innovative scheme was designed – and fully implemented – in 
record time. Instead of the present-day model to establish ‘bad banks’ and separate 
them from ‘good banks’, Japanese bureaucrats ordered all bank loans and deposits to 
be divided into ‘old accounts’ and ‘new accounts’. Initially, all ‘old accounts’ were 
frozen, while business could proceed in new accounts. The banks had to follow a 
specific sequence for writing off loans to firms bankrupted by the war indemnities 
cancellation and on investments made in colonial and wartime enterprises (first by 
using retained profits and reserves, then by the shareholders – up to 90% of capital – 
and then by the creditors – first old depositors, then new depositors). In the end, Y25 
bn special losses were written off. 56 banks had to write off 90% of their capital; four 
could not meet their obligations at all (Tsutsui, 1988).  
 
Thanks to the provision for ‘new accounts’ “the bulk of the economy was not 
seriously affected by the banks’ internal re-orderings.” (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 31). 
Meanwhile, 260 wartime financial institutions (such as the Wartime Finance Bank 
etc.) with total assets of Y450 bn were liquidated by SCAP. “By 1948, the banks had 
been restored to a solid financial basis and prepared for a constructive role in Japan’s 
postwar revival.” (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 35). The government was freed from crippling 
wartime debts through cancellation of debts. “The liquidation of wartime banks and 
the financial reorganisation were essentially complicated exercises in accounting 
which, in effect, merely enabled the wartime financial system to function under 
peaceful conditions. (Tsutsui, 1988, p. 35). 
 
The second thrust of policy initiatives centred on the recognition that credit creation 
had to be expanded, even though impaired bank balance sheets were rendering banks 
more risk-averse. Initially, the Ministry of Finance took the initiative, until such 
moves were thwarted by the Bank of Japan and the occupation authorities, who 
favoured a greater role for and monopoly of control over credit creation by the Bank 
of Japan.   23
 
The Economic Stabilisation Board initially used the Reconstruction Finance 
Department inside the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ, then still a government-owned 
bank) to supply the economy with funding. In January 1947, this was separated and 
established as the publicly owned Reconstruction Finance Bank (Fukkō Kinyū Kinko), 
whose job was to provide preferential funding to strategic industries (Okazaki and 
Okuno-Fujiwara, 1999).
5 This government bank was in turn funded by government 
bills that the central bank had to discount (at the time, the wartime Bank of Japan law 
remained in place, relegating the Bank of Japan to the status of subordinated agency 
that had to receive orders from the Ministry of Finance; the law and this status were 
changed only in 1997, when the Bank of Japan became legally independent).  
 
Second, the government planners took the initiative to re-establish the priority 
production system from the wartime era with the 1947 Regulations on the Provision 
of Funds by Financial Institutions (Kinyū Kikan Shikin Yūzū Junsoku), announced by 
the Ministry of Finance.
6 The priority classification was simply switched from war 
objectives to peacetime goals. Based on a “priority listing for lending industrial 
funds,” limits were set on the maximum amount of loans each financial institution 
could extend. A ranking was established of equipment and operating funds for 460 
types of business in four categories, A1, A2, B, and C, “in almost exactly the same 
way as the financing arrangements based on the wartime Emergency Funds 
Adjustment Law” (Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1999). The latter wartime law was 
replaced by the Ministry of Finance with the equivalent Emergency Financial Order 
(Kinyū Kinkyū Sochi Rei). 
 
In accordance with the current Bank of Japan Law (promulgated in 1942), The 
Ministry of Finance expected the central bank to act merely as its agent by faithfully 
enforcing the Ministry of Finance’s instructions. The central bank resented this, as 
well as the activities of the Reconstruction Finance Bank, an institution that 
challenged its monopoly on the control of the creation and allocation of credit 
(Yoshino, 1962).  
 
Bank of Japan policies 
Bank of Japan governor Ichimada, who had been an apprentice with Hjalmar Schacht 
in the 1920s in Berlin (Werner, 2003), thus established a rival credit allocation system 
at the central bank, which would direct funds to the priority industries high on the list 
(Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1999). Meanwhile, the implementation of the Ministry 
of Finance’s priority lending categories was largely incapacitated: Ichimada achieved 
this by assigning only a small section of eight to ten staff to this complex task 
(Ministry guidelines had become quite detailed, running to twenty pages), a group 
whose other job was the equally complex task of administering frozen bank accounts 
from the wartime period (Tsutsui, 1988). 
 
The Bank of Japan’s control over bank credit had already been asserted, when the 
director of the Banking Department had issued instructions that “in principle” banks 
were not allowed to increase their outstanding loan balance beyond the balance of 20 
March 1946 without a permit from the Bank of Japan, as well as the government. This 
                                                 
5  The Reconstruction Finance Bank served a similar function as the Wartime Finance Bank. See 
Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1999).  
6 On the priority production system, keisha seisan hoshiki, see Nakamura (1995), p. 35.   24
prevented low-priority industries and consumers from laying claims to scarce 
resources. Yoshino (1962) explicitly compares these measures with Schacht’s credit 
control policies in the 1920s.   
 
The Bank of Japan under Ichimada now adopted a two-pronged reflation policy. First, 
while the banks were damaged by bad debts, Ichimada turned the Bank of Japan itself 
into the banker to the nation. Schacht had used active discounting of certain types of 
bills issued by official organizations (such as Mefo) to selectively direct credit to 
priority industries or projects. Ichimada did the same in the early post-war years with 
his “stamped bill system,” under which companies in specific sectors were invited to 
apply for funding directly, or via their banks, to the Bank of Japan’s Banking 
department. The Bank of Japan discounted or rediscounted bills of exchange from 
selected firms in the coal industry, fertilizer manufacturing sector, textile fabrication 
industry, and certain regional industries and exporters (which competed for export 
trade bills to purchase necessary raw material imports) (Calder, 1993). Retail, 
agriculture, education, and construction were then considered to be of lower priority. 
Most domestic consumption-related industries fell into the low-priority category. 
Sectors such as real estate, department stores, hotels, restaurants, entertainment, 
publishing, and alcoholic beverages—not to mention consumers themselves—were 
without much hope of obtaining funds. Ichimada felt that Japan could ill afford such 
luxuries (Ichimada, 1986). All this took place in the Loan Coordination Division 
(Yūshi Assenbu) of the Bank of Japan’s Banking Department.
7 
 
Banks were brought back into the process through help in restoring their balance 
sheets and through Bank of Japan “guidance” of their discounting of bills. Restoring 
banks’ balance sheets was partly achieved through the system of old and new 
accounts. In principle, the most effective method to achieve this, however, was 
through the special powers of the central bank. 
  
Ichimada merely needed to order the Bank of Japan to buy the banks’ worthless 
wartime bonds at face value – or at least significantly above a potential (they were not 
traded) market price. In its own currency, a central bank does not have to worry about 
bad debts. By purchasing them and keeping them on its balance sheet, the central 
bank can neutralise the negative impact of non-performing assets.
8  This made the 
banks dependent on the goodwill of the central bank, and willing to cooperate with its 
informal guidance.
9 If the central bank so wished, it could extend unlimited funding to 
them. In the end, Ichimada had reinstated full control over both the quantity of new 
bank loans and their sectoral allocation in a mechanism that later became known as 
“window guidance” (Yoshino, 1962). 
                                                 
7 Personal interview, March 1993, with a member of the Yūshi Assenbu, who had previously been 
posted in Berlin until 1945. 
8 The balance sheet of a central bank is unlike that of a company. Applying the same principles as used 
with companies or banks to the central bank’s accounts misses the main point of its function: a central 
bank’s liabilities are legal tender. They cannot therefore be considered liabilities in the true sense, since 
they do not carry any servicing costs and do not need to be redeemed. A central bank will always make 
a profit on its asset purchases, since it obtains valuable assets for free. From this it is also clear that the 
purpose of a central bank is never to make profits—making money is something it can literally do. Its 
purpose is monetary policy: the creation and allocation of purchasing power. 
9 “An additional factor strengthening the leverage of the BoJ during the immediate postwar period was 
the large holdings of wartime government bonds by the city banks. Lacking a market for such 
obligations, the city banks were at the mercy of the BoJ to redeem them.” Calder (1993), p. 79.   25
 
In summary, the Bank of Japan bought war bonds/gov’t bonds from banks at a price 
significantly above market value. It engaged in direct lending to companies and loan 
syndication (shikin assen), whereby it would bring borrowers and several lenders 
together. Further, it regulated the quantity and allocation of bank credit creation 
(credit controls), purchased financing bills issued by gov’t banks, notably the 
Reconstruction Finance Bank, thus backing its activities with credit creation. Finally, 
it lent directly to the government in order to monetise fiscal policy 
 
Result 
The post-1945 policies were spectacularly successful. A credit crunch, deflation or 
even a recession were avoided. Banks were considered healthy by late 1948. The 
central bank was not the only institution deserving credit for this. The ESB’s activities, 
including the lending by the Reconstruction Finance Bank, had played a major role. 
Government deficit spending, as well as the Reconstruction Finance Bank, were 
funded through the issuance of short-term financing bills or bonds that the central 
bank had to discount. Demand accelerated as a result of the expanded credit creation 
by the central bank and banks. There was no deflation. Given the impairment of 
productive capacity due to the war, however, inflationary pressures built up quickly. 
Further, the government and central bank may not have coordinated their credit 
creation policies; in aggregate they appear to have erred on the expansionary side, 
producing inflation. This, however, was considered acceptable by policy-makers at 
the time. 
 
 
5. Evaluation of the comparative study and lessons for theory and policy 
 
By all counts, the banking crisis of 1945 should have turned into a major economic 
recession, if not worse. Meanwhile, the banking crisis of 1992 onwards was far milder, 
and thus by comparison it should have produced a briefer period of economic 
recession. These expectations are heightened by the fact that companies were virtually 
solely dependent on banks for their external funding in 1945 and the early post-war 
years, while during the 1990s many other options were open to them, including 
funding from capital markets. 
 
Meanwhile, the freer market system of the 1990s should, by the standards of orthodox 
neoclassical economics, have helped return the economy to full employment, while 
the pervasive government intervention of the war and early post-war years should 
have resulted in a vast misallocation of resources.  
 
In this paper it is found that the difference between the outcomes of the two banking 
crises is the policy response by the authorities. It was the very interventionist 
approach of the early post-war era that made the difference. However, it was 
intervention of a specific kind, namely in the credit markets to create and allocate 
credit, and by making full use of the central bank’s ability to create credit. 
 
A model that successfully links the banking sector and the economy demonstrates that 
an expansion of credit creation is the necessary and sufficient condition for producing 
a speedy recovery. Governments and central banks have ample tools available to do 
this, even when banks are most severely impaired (as they were in 1945). After 1945,   26
these tools were utilised. After 1992 they were not. Meanwhile, even if banks are not 
badly impaired, and even if fiscal and interest rate stimulation of historic proportions 
are lavished on the economy, all of this will come to nothing, if it fails to expand 
credit creation – as happened in the 1990s. Funding from capital markets, as 
transpired in the 1990s, also cannot help. The reason is that capital markets, unlike the 
banking system, do not create credit and money. This implies that financial 
deregulation towards less reliance on banks may be entirely misguided. 
 
It is in this context that I would like to briefly comment on the two Yamaichi crises – 
as promised in the introduction. The first, unlike the second, remained contained and 
had virtually no negative impact on the economy, because the finance ministry used 
its legal powers over the central bank to order it to create credit and supply sufficient 
amounts to the troubled institution. As indicated above, unlike most of the 
government-orchestrated bailouts introduced since 2008, this method has no costs to 
society or the economy, as tax payers are not forced to foot the bill. Thus the way the 
government or central bank reacted in the case of the two Yamaichi crises is, on a 
much smaller scale, a mirror image of the differing policy responses to the 1945 and 
post-1992 crises. 
 
This study has also highlighted the inadequacy of traditional approaches in explaining 
these events. The link between banks and the economy remains neglected. This link 
can be found in the role of banks as creators of the bulk of the money supply (credit 
creation). The disaggregation of the ‘money supply’ as envisaged by Keynes and 
Friedman can be implemented and is indeed fruitful. The quantity equations of 
disaggregated credit solve many of the most challenging ‘anomalies’ in modern 
macroeconomics. This model is based on fewer assumptions – perfect information, 
complete markets, etc. are not required for it to work – and hence has the attractive 
feature of simplicity and robustness.  
 
Finally, policy implications for the prevention of banking crises have been 
highlighted: authorities, especially central banks, merely need to monitor and, when 
necessary, suppress, the creation of credit used for non-GDP transactions (called CF in 
the model shown). More fundamentally, if the right incentive structure and regulatory 
environment is created so that banks create credit mainly for productive purposes, it 
can be confidently expected that banking will remain sustainable and boom/bust 
cycles can be avoided. 
 
Some of these results seem to have been known to policy-makers in the 1940s. This 
knowledge had apparently been lost by the 1990s, when the lack of coordination of 
Bank of Japan policies with the government, excessive independence of the central 
bank and a lack of understanding of the role of credit creation exacerbated the 
situation. 
   27
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